projectors, the record appears to be just a sign-out sheet, and the LEA official simply checks whether "the recordation of use is attempted." 49 (Mar.lApr. Respondents neither question the secular purpose of the Chapter 2 (Title II) program nor contend that it creates an excessive entanglement. Although the dissent professes concern for "the implied exclusion of the less favored," post, at 868, the exclusion of pervasively sectarian schools from government-aid programs is just that, particularly given the history of such exclusion. Although JUSTICE SOUTER does not rest his decision on this point, he does "not[e] the likelihood that unconstitutional supplantation occurred as well." JUSTICE O'CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE BREYER joins, concurring in the judgment. Id., at 683. Id., at 229. As that dissent made clear, diversion is the use of government aid to further a religious message. L. 89-10, 79 Stat. See 487 U. S., at 636, 647, 648 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Id., at 95a-96a. In sum, "neutrality" originally entered this field of jurisprudence as a conclusory term, a label for the required rela-, tionship between the government and religion as a state of equipoise between government as ally and government as adversary. Regardless of whether these factors are constitutional requirements, they are sufficient to find that the program at issue does not have the impermissible effect of advancing religion. 18 The coordinator of the Jefferson Parish LEA ordered the books recalled sometime in the summer or early fall of 1985, and it appears that the schools had complied with the recall order by the second week of December 1985. See id., at 228-229. 5 Indeed, two of the dissenters in Allen agreed with the majority on this method of analysis, asking whether the books at issue were similar enough to fire and police protection. And just as a government interpreter does not herself inculcate a religious message-even when she is conveying one-so also a government computer or overhead projector does not itself inculcate a religious message, even when it is conveying one. JUSTICE O'CONNOR acknowledges that the Court in Zobrest and Witters approved programs that involved actual diversion. Although an accompanying letter indicates that much of the school's equipment was purchased with federal funds, id., at 205a, the chart does not provide a breakdown identifying specific Chapter 2 usage. Id., at 235. See infra, at 864-867. from resting on a divertibility rationale. of Central School Dist. It is well established, in numerous other contexts, that courts should refrain from trolling through a person's or institution's religious beliefs. As I have previously explained, neutrality is important, but it is by no means the only "axiom in the history and precedent of the Establishment Clause." Accordingly, we hold that Chapter 2 is not a law respecting an establishment of religion. ("Experience proves that the Establishment Clause, like the Free Speech Clause, cannot easily be reduced to a single test"); Rosenberger, 515 U. S., at 847-849 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring) (discussing need for linedrawing); id., at 852 (noting lack of a single "Grand Unified Theory" for Establishment Clause and citing Kiryas Joel); cf. No.1 v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236 (1968), in which the challenged government practice was lending textbooks to pupils of schools both public and private, including religious ones (as to which there was no evidence that they had previously supplied books to their classes and some evidence that they had not, id., at 244, n. 6). JUSTICE SOUTER, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS and JUSTICE GINSBURG join, dissenting. In 1965, Congress passed the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, 79 Stat. See Zobrest, 509 U. S., at 13, and n. 10. of Central School Dist. See 392 U. S., at 252 (Black, J., dissenting); id., at 272 (Fortas, J., dissenting). He held that Chapter 2 violated the Establishment Clause because, under the second part of our three-part test in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 612-613 (1971), the program had the primary effect of advancing religion. The aid follows the child. 487 U. S., at 623 (emphasis in original). Over three years, Jefferson Parish religious schools ordered approximately 191 religious library books through Chapter 2. The Fifth Circuit therefore concluded that Meek and Wolman controlled, and thus it held Chapter 2 unconstitutional. Second, in neither case did the program at issue provide direct aid on a schoolwide basis (as Chapter 2 does here); in both we found a distinction based on the genuinely independent, private choices which allocated such very different types of aid (tax deductions and university scholarship money that did not amount to substantial support of the university). "[E]xperience witnesseth that ecclesiastical establishments, instead of maintaining the purity and efficacy of Religion, have had a contrary operation." For the same reasons, "this carefully constrained program also cannot reasonably be viewed as an endorsement of religion." Whether a law's benefit is sufficiently close to universally general welfare paradigms to be classified with them, as distinct from religious aid, is a function of the purpose and effect of the challenged law in all its particularity. As Agostini explained, the same reasoning was at work in Zobrest, where we allowed the government-funded interpreter to provide assistance at a Catholic school, "even though she would be a mouthpiece for religious instruction," because the interpreter was provided according to neutral eligibility criteria and private choice. merely to prevent "subsidization" of religion, see id., at 394. Even if I were instead willing to find this incident to be evidence of a likelihood of future violations, the evidence is insignificant. The plurality concedes this basic point. Yet that is just what this factor requires, as was evident before the District Court. See id., at 154a. Considering Chapter 2 in light of our more recent case law, we conclude that it neither results in religious indoctrination by the government nor defines its recipients by reference to religion. 14-17. JUSTICE SOUTER provides a comprehensive review of our Establishment Clause cases on government aid to religious institutions that is useful for its explanation of the various ways in which we have used the term "neutrality" in our decisions. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U. S. 38, 110 (1985) (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted). discussing the materials-and-equipment program, did not even cite Allen. See, e. g., id., at 226-227. Cf. Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U. S. 291, 299-300 (1899); Wolman, 433 U. S., at 244. Agostini's second primary criterion-whether an aid program defines its recipients by reference to religion, id., at 234-is closely related to the first. We approved a similar arrangement in Quick Bear, 210 U. S., at 77-82, and the Federal Government appears to have long had such a program, see 1999 Catalog of Caring: Combined Federal Campaign of the National Capital Area 44, 45, 59, 74-75 (listing numerous religious organizations, many of which engage in religious education or in proselytizing, to which federal employees may contribute via payroll deductions); see generally Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Thus, the basic principle of establishment scrutiny of aid remains the principle as stated in Everson, that there may be no public aid to religion or support for the religious mission of any institution. Agostini's second primary criterion for determining the effect of governmental aid is closely related to the first. Regan, 444 U. S., at 661-662 (internal quotation marks omitted). Reduced to its essentials, the plurality's rule states that government aid to religious schools does not have the effect of advancing religion so long as the aid is offered on a neutral basis and the aid is secular in content. Instead it gave definitive examples of public benefits provided pervasively throughout society that would be of some value to organized religion but not in a way or to a degree that could sensibly be described as giving it aid or violating the neutrality requirement: there was no Establishment Clause concern with "such general government services as ordinary police and fire protection, connections for sewage disposal, public highways and sidewalks." Lee v. Weisman, 505 U. S. 577, 608 (1992) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Illinois ex rel. See 521 U. S., at 226-228 (noting lack of evidence of inculcation of religion by Title I instructors, legal requirement that Title I services be supplemental to regular curricula, and that no Title I funds reached religious schools' coffers). To hold a statute unconstitutional because it lacks a secular content restriction is quite different. 108a. The statute explicitly requires that such aid be "secular, neutral, and nonideological," and the record indicates that the Louisiana SEA and the Jefferson Parish LEA have faithfully enforced this requirement insofar as relevant to this case. (collecting cases). Aid is allocated based on enrollment: "Private schools receive Chapter 2 materials and equipment based on the per capita number of students at each school," Walker, 46 F. 3d, at 1464, and allocations to private schools must "be equal (consistent with the number of children to be served) to expenditures for programs under this subchapter for children enrolled in the public schools of the [LEA]," 20 U. S. C. § 7372(b). Because the First Amendment also bars any prohibition of individual free exercise of religion, and because religious organizations cannot be isolated from the basic government functions that create the civil environment, it is as much necessary as it is difficult to draw lines between forbidden aid and lawful benefit. (d) The Court should follow the rule applied in the context of textbook lending programs: To establish a First Amendment violation, plaintiffs must prove that the aid actually is, or has been, used for religious. Sixth Circuit. Id., at 678 (plurality opinion); see Lemon, 403 U. S., at 671 (White, J., concurring in judgment). Finally, in Agostini itself, we used the reasoning of Witters and Zobrest to conclude that remedial classes provided under Title I of the ESEA by public employees did not impermissibly finance religious indoctrination. 473 U. S., at 399-400 (concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). & Religious Liberty, 413 U. S. 472, 478 (1973) (noting that District Court approved testing cost reimbursement as payment for services that were "'secular, neutral, or nonideological''' in character, citing Lemon, 403 U. S., at. As we explained in Agostini, "we have departed from the rule relied on in Ball that all government aid that directly assists the educational function of religious schools is invalid." In terms of public perception, a government program of direct aid to religious schools based on the number of students attending each school differs meaningfully from the government distributing aid directly to individual students. classes during the schoolday, require attendance at mass, and provide extracurricular religious activities. It was undeniable in Witters that the aid (tuition) would ultimately go to the Inland Empire School of the Bible and would support religious education. Id., at 122a-123a. Nor would it be worthwhile here to engage in extended discussion of why the goal of preventing courts from having to "trol[l] through a person's or institution's religious beliefs," ibid., calls for less aid and commingling of government with religion, not for tolerance of their effects. As we briefly explained in Agostini, id., at 230-231, this second criterion looks to the same set of facts as does our focus, under the first criterion, on neutrality, see id., at 225-226, but the second criterion uses those facts to answer a somewhat different question-whether the criteria for allocating the aid "creat[e] a financial incentive to undertake religious indoctrination," id., at 231. Short of formally replacing the Establishment Clause, a more dependable key to the public fisc or a cleaner break with prior law would be difficult to imagine. Thus, government benefits accruing to these pervasively religious primary and secondary schools raise special dangers of diversion into support for the religious indoctrination of children and the involvement of government in religious training and practice. At least three concerns have been expressed since the founding and run throughout our First Amendment jurisprudence. These admissions, however, do not prove that the safeguards are inadequate. Raimes v. Mitchell Filing 3 MEMORANDUM. 16 In fact, a label, by associating the government with any religious use of the equipment, exacerbates any Establishment Clause problem that might exist when diversion occurs. Any criteria, moreover, must not only define the margins of the establishment prohibition, but must respect the succeeding Clause of the First Amendment guaranteeing religion's free exercise. Id., at 223. School Dist. 23 The trial judge found that the Roman Catholic schools in question operate under the general supervision and authority of the Archbishop of New Orleans and their parish pastors, and are located next to parish churches and sometimes a rectory or convent. Agostini, supra, at 225-226.8. See Agostini, 521 U. S., at 230-231; see also id., at 230. Post, at 909, n. 27. Dan Lewis, the director of Louisiana's Chapter 2 program, testified that he discovered some of the religious books while performing a random check during a state monitoring visit to a Jefferson Parish religious school. Although the presence of private choice is easier to see when aid literally passes through the hands of individuals-which is why we have mentioned directness in the same breath with private choice, see, e. g., Agostini, 521 U. S., at 226; Witters, supra, at 487; Mueller, supra, at 399-there is no reason why the Establishment Clause requires such a form. The majority misapplies it. It is arguable, however, at least after Witters v. Washington Dept. Ante, at 832-834; see also App. See post, at 903, 906910.17 In any event, for reasons we discussed in Part II-B-2. 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